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1977] NOTES 239
defendant or counsel in a non-capital case. On the other hand, as the
plurality noted, five Justices, in fact the same five Justices supporting the
actual holding of the instant case, had in previous cases distinguished the
death penalty from all other forms of punishment. It is hoped that this
distinction, which brought much needed reforms to capital sentencing
procedures, will not be used to prevent similar and equally needed reforms
in the sentencing process for non-capital cases.
John A. Mouton III
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MIRANDA
The accused surrendered on the advice of counsel, was arrested under
a warrant, arraigned, and committed to jail in one city for abducting a
child in another locality. Although his attorney advised him by telephone
not to make any statements to the police while being transported back to
the scene of the crime-and made an agreement with the police that no
interrogation would occur-the defendant made incriminating disclosures
during the trip after a police detective stated that "the parents of this little
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial." I Notwithstanding his objec-
tions to the admission of such evidence, the prisoner's conviction for first
degree murder was affirmed by the state supreme court, and he subse-
quently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, securing relief in the federal
district court2 and in the Eighth Circuit.' The United States Supreme Court
affirmed in a 5-4 decision and held that the prisoner was denied his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments. The Court found that judicial proceedings had been
initiated against him before the start of the automobile trip, that the
prisoner had a right to legal representation during interrogation, that the
police detectives had in fact interrogated him during the return trip, and
that there was no reasonable basis for finding a waiver of the right to
counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).
One of the most difficult and controversial areas of American crimin-
al procedure today is the subject of pre-trial police interrogation of an
1. Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1236 (1977).
2. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
3. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974).
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accused4 and the related question whether such interrogation should be
conditioned upon the presence of counsel. Traditionally, the fifth amend-
ment confession cases and the sixth amendment right to counsel cases
have been regarded as separate and distinct areas of the law. 5 In fifth
amendment cases for nearly thirty years, a "voluntariness" test, which
depended upon the "totality of the circumstances," was used to determine
whether the Constitution required exclusion of a confession. 6 The sixth
amendment right to counsel did not attach until arraignment,' and was
therefore not an issue in many confession cases.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Warren Court began to
merge the confession issue with the right to counsel and recognized as
"fundamental" the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
8
and the sixth amendment right to counsel, 9 extending those Bill of Rights
guaranties to defendants in state proceedings under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In Spano v. New York,' ° a 1959 decision, a
confession was held to violate the traditional "voluntariness" test, but
four concurring justices agreed with the defendant's contention that his
absolute right to counsel in a capital case attached upon indictment, which
occurred prior to his confession.II
In two key decisions announced during its 1964 term, Massiah v.
4. See Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62,
72-73 (1966).
5. Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Observations, and Some Ques-
tions, 20 VAND. L. REV. 39, 39-44 (1966).
6. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 510
(4th ed. 1974). See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §11
(1954); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §822 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
8. "[N]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), holding that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable to the states.
9. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV which states in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
10. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
11. Id. at 323, 326. See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (the
absolute right to counsel also attached at arraignment in capital cases); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the absolute right to counsel is available to




United States' 2 and Escobedo v. Illinois ,13 the Court extended the con-
stitutional scope of the right to counsel beyond its traditional function of
aiding the accused in a trial or other hearing. Persons under police
investigation were held to have a right to legal representation when they
are under indictment, as in Massiah, or when, before indictment, the
police have "focused" upon the accused with the "purpose to elicit a
confession," as in Escobedo.
Freed on bond after indictment, the defendant in Massiah was with-
out counsel when he incriminated himself while talking in a car with a
codefendant who had allowed government agents to install electronic
eavesdropping equipment. In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the
Court held that under the sixth amendment's guaranty of the right to
counsel, the defendant's incriminating statements were inadmissible at
trial, and the majority indicated this would be true if the statements had
been obtained by police interrogation. 4 The Court reiterated the constitu-
tional principle earlier established in Powell v. Alabama 15 that a defendant
is as much entitled to the sixth amendment right to counsel at the critical
pre-trial stage of arraignment as at the trial itself. 26
In contrast to Massiah, the Court employed an extremely par-
ticularized approach to the confession and right to counsel dilemma in
Escobedo. The Court carefully limited the opinion to the facts of the case,
explaining that when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and begins to focus upon a particular suspect in police
custody, a defendant's statements are inadmissible if the police have not
effectively warned the suspect of his constitutional right to remain silent
and have refused his requests to consult with a lawyer. 17
Miranda v. Arizona,1s a 1966 decision, differed from Escobedo by
12. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
13. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14. 377 U.S. at 203. See also Enker & Elsen, Counselfor the Suspect: Massiah
v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964).
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. 377 U.S. at 205. The Court in Massiah cited Powell at 57.
17. 378 U.S. at 485.
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally Y. KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN OUR TIME 1-95 (1965); F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS (1962); C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 91-
151 (1956). See also Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary
Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (1936); Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Kauper, Judicial
Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV.
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relying upon the fifth amendment rather than the right to counsel and by
announcing a generalized framework of constitutional limitations upon
police interrogation. Without specifically concentrating upon the facts,
Chief Justice Warren, writing for five members, stated precise constitu-
tional requisites for rendering statements admissible which are obtained
through custodial police interrogation. 19 The Court held the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to custodial interroga-
tion and extended the fifth amendment's exclusionary requirement to
statements unconstitutionally obtained through interrogation.2' The Court
defined "custodial interrogation" as questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. If an individual
subject to interrogation indicates in any manner and at any time prior to or
during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. The Court further held that not all confessions are inadmissible,
giving as an example statements made voluntarily and freely without any
compelling influences. 21
In its discussion of waiver of fifth and sixth amendment claims, the
Miranda Court relied upon the traditional test announced in Johnson v.
Zerbst 22 that an effective waiver involves "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 23 The Court held that if
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests upon the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. While a
request for a lawyer during interrogation affirmatively secures one's right
to counsel, failure to ask does not constitute waiver. A valid waiver will
not be presumed simply from silence after warnings are given by the
police or from the fact that a confession was eventually obtained.
1224 (1932); Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966);
The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 201 (1966).
19. 384 U.S. at 467-79. These requisites, now known as the "Miranda warn-
ings," are as follows: the accused must be told by a law enforcement official that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used as evidence against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during interrogation, and that a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him if he is indigent.
20. Id. at 467. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) for a discussion
of the exclusionary rule.
21. 384 U.S. at 478.
22. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
23. Id. at 464.
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Decided seven years after Miranda and under the auspices of a new
chief justice, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte24 reflected a change- in Court
leadership and limited the applicability of the Warren Court decisions by
returning to a totality-of-circumstances test to determine whether there
was a valid waiver of a recognized constitutional right. In holding that the
defendant's consent to the search was voluntary, the Court stated that
while knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the prosecution does not have the burden of proving such
knowledge as a prerequisite to show voluntary consent. The Court reduced
the high standard for waiver by ruling that the requirement of a "knowing
and intelligent" waiver of constitutional rights, while applicable to the due
process guarantees involving the preservation of a fair trial, was not
applicable to the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
In the instant case, twenty-two states and other amici curiae had
requested the Court to use Brewer v. Williams as a vehicle to overrule
Miranda,25 but the majority of the Court focused upon a delineation of
those actions which are sufficient to constitute waiver of the right to
counsel and those police actions which are tantamount to interrogation.26
After discussing the differences of opinion over the scope of the right to
counsel, Justice Stewart stated that the right to counsel granted by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments attaches, at the latest, when judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated against the defendant by formal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
27
After holding that such judicial proceedings had been initiated against
Williams, 28 Justice Stewart recited the facts and recounted the detective's
24. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
25. 97 S. Ct. at 1259. See Frankel, 'From Private Fights Toward Public Justice,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 529 n.49 (1976), which mentions Williams v. Brewer, 509
F.2d 227, 232-34 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975), in connection
with waiver of the right to counsel.
26. 97 S. Ct. at 1239.
27. Id. Justice Stewart stated, "There can be no doubt . . . that judicial
proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile
ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he
had been arraigned ... and he had been committed by the court to confinement in
jail." Id.
28. Id. Another issue decided by the Court which is outside the scope of this
casenote was the petitioner's threshold claim that the federal district court disre-
garded the provisions of 28 USC § 2254(d) (1970) in making its findings of fact. The
Court held that the federal district court correctly applied the statute because it
made no factfindings in conflict with those of the state courts, and its additional
factfindings were carefully explained and later approved by the court of appeals.
1977]
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testimony to conclude that the "Christian burial speech" 2 9 was tan-
tamount to interrogation. The Court pointed out that the state courts had
proceeded upon the same hypothesis by recognizing that Williams had
been entitled to counsel at the time the statements were made.3" Justice
Stewart then reasoned that there would have been no right to counsel if
there had been no interrogation.
The Court held that the circumstances in Brewer were constitutional-
ly indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah, thereby avoiding a
"wooden''31 or technical application of the Massiah doctrine. While
slight factual differences exist between the cases, the majority resolved the
difficulties by stating that whether incriminating disclosures made in the
absence of counsel were elicited openly or surreptitiously is constitutional-
ly irrelevant in determining whether the right to counsel had been abridg-
ed.32 Justice Stewart also dismissed the argument that the agreement
The Court found that the "District Court did make some additional findings of fact
based upon its examination of the state court record, among them the findings that
Kelly, the Davenport lawyer, had requested permission to ride in the police car
from Davenport to Des Moines and that Detective Learning had refused the re-
quest." Id. at 1238.
29. Id. at 1236. During the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines,
Detective Learning delivered what has been referred to in the briefs and the oral
arguments as the "Christian burial speech." Addressing Williams as "Reverend,"
he said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's
raining . . . . They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel
that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is,
that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it
you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the
area . . . I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this
little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas Eve and murdered. And I feel we
should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning ...
and possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id. The police officer knew that Williams was a former mental patient and was
deeply religious. The Court stated that the "Christian burial speech" was tan-
tamount to interrogation, since (1) the police officer deliberately and designedly set
out to elicit information from the accused just as surely as if he had formally
interrogated him, and (2) the police officer was fully aware that the accused was
represented by counsel who had advised him not to talk to police during the trip, yet
the officer purposely sought during the accused's isolation from his lawyers to
obtain as much incriminating information as possible. Id. at 1239-40.
30. Id. at 1240.
31. Id. at 1240-41.
32. Id. at 1240. See McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (965); United States v.
Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358 (1970); United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405
F.2d 632, 636 (1969); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1967).
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between Williams' attorney and the police was not enforceable by holding
that constitutional law, not contract law, was applicable.33
Dealing with the waiver issue, the Court first noted that the Iowa
courts had recognized that Williams had the right to counsel but had held
that he had waived his right during the automobile trip.34 However, the
majority affirmed the federal district court and the court of appeals rulings
that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving an effective waiver
and that the Iowa state courts had applied an incorrect constitutional
standard to determine waiver. 35 The proper standard to determine such
waiver is that the state must prove "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. "36 Although an individual has
been informed of his right to counsel and appears to understand it, waiver
of such right requires not merely comprehension but relinquishment, and
an individual's continued insistence upon counsel refutes any suggestion
that he waived his right. 37 However, the Court stressed that it was not
suggesting that Williams could not have waived his rights under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments without notice to counsel.
Three of the five justices comprising the majority propounded their
views in separate concurring opinions. Justice Marshall's concurrence,
written largely in response to the dissenting opinions, reflected his concern
with the dilemma of balancing the institutional integrity of the Court with
the societal need for protection against criminals. Justice Marshall be-
lieved "[tihe dissenters have . . . lost sight of the fundamental constitu-
tional backbone of our criminal law," 38 and as he cast his vote with the
majority, he invoked Justice Brandeis' dissenting view in Olmstead v.
U.S., 3 9 that it is essential that the government set an example for its
citizens by following its own laws.
Justice Stevens' concurrence emphasized the need for dispassionate
decision-making by the Court and focused upon the issue of whether a
fugitive from justice can rely upon his lawyer's advice concerning volun-
tary surrender. He seemed to advocate an ethical as well as a contract law
approach concerning the agreement between Williams' lawyer and the
33. 97 S. Ct. at 1240.
34. Id. at 1241. See the Iowa Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Williams, 182
N.W.2d 396, 402 (1970).
35. Id. at 1241-42. See the federal district court's ruling in 375 F. Supp. at 182
and the court of appeals' reasoning in 509 F.2d at 233.
36. 97 S. Ct. at 1242, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 1242.
38. Id. at 1244.
39. 277 U.S. 438 (1922). Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent is at 471-85.
1977]
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police, stating that "the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise
to this lawyer." 40 In contrast, Justice Powell carefully delineated the facts
of the case, emphasizing that one's perception of the facts determines the
decision's outcome. 4'
The reasoning of Chief Justice Burger's strongly worded dissent
reflects the concerns expressed in Justice Cardozo's prophecy about the
exclusionary rule, "The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.'"4 The Chief Justice stated his belief that the accused made a
valid waiver of his right to counsel when he led the police to the body and
that, even if there was no waiver, the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to non-egregious police conduct, as in the instant case, where the
prisoner's disclosures were uncoerced, and where guilt was manifest. He
stressed that a savage murder of a small child had occurred, that the public
should not be punished for the mistakes of law enforcement officers, and
that the officer should be punished directly if he were guilty of wrong-
doing.
43
Expressing disbelief that the Court could conclude that no valid
waiver existed, the Chief Justice contended that the majority not only
conceded that Williams' disclosures were voluntary but also failed to
define what evidentiary showing the State failed to make.' He rejected
Justice Powell's finding that the detective's actions constituted "interroga-
tion," as opposed to mere "statements" intended to prick the conscience
of the accused. Unlike Justice Marshall, Chief Justice Burger chose to
40. 97 S. Ct. at 1248.
41. Id. at 1245. A point not discussed in this casenote but of importance to the
decision is the reviewability of lower court decisions in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Justice Powell dealt specifically with Chief Justice Burger's dissenting reference to
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which held that federal habeas corpus relief
may not be granted to a state prisoner on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial where a state had
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim. Id.
at 482. See Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 289 (1976), for a discussion of Stone. Justice
Powell noted in Brewer that the lower courts had no occasion to consider the
applicability of Stone, since it was decided subsequently to Brewer. He further
stated that the Supreme Court had no reason to consider the possible applicability
of Stone.
42. Id. at 1248, quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). In connec-
tion with the analysis of dissents, see Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated
Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794 (1953). For an understanding of Chief Justice
Burger's decisionmaking from 1956-1969, see J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1935); Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal
Procedure, 1956-1969, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (1975).
43. 97 S. Ct. at 1248.
44. Id. at 1249.
[Vol. 38
NOTES
place the societal need for protection higher in priority than the Court's
faithful adherence to the preservation of individuals' constitutional rights
as he criticized the Court's application of "tenuous strands" of constitu-
tional jurisprudence."
The Chief Justice expressed justifiable concern over the exclusionary
rule, pondering the important question whether it should be applied me-
chanically in all cases outside the fourth amendment, and also whether its
goals were furthered by its application in the instant case. After discussing
the background and the flaws of the exclusionary rule, he emphasized that
deterrence of unlawful police conduct is its only valid justification. Stres-
sing that no risk of unreliability existed in Brewer and that Miranda's
safeguards are not personal constitutional rights but only judicially created
measures, Burger argued that suppression of evidence should no longer be
automatic for violation of mere prophylactic rules. Analogizing the fourth
and fifth amendment exclusionary applications, Burger stated that there
should be no "knee-jerk" suppression of reliable evidence with sixth
amendment cases.' The Chief Justice reasoned that the exclusionary rule
should be applied upon the basis of its benefits and costs rather than upon
the adoption of a "formalistic analysis varying with the constitutional
provision invoked." 47
In a carefully footnoted dissenting opinion, Justice White expressed
the view that the prisoner had knowingly and intentionally waived his right
to assistance of counsel. 8 He admonished the Court that waiver is not a
formalistic concept, and he contended that "wafer thin distinctions"
should not determine whether a murderer goes free. 49 While agreeing with
the majority that Brewer was not the case in which to overrule Miranda,
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissenting opinion, disagreed that Brewer
is indistinguishable from Massiah5° and added that the Court's holding
45. Id. at 1250.
46. Id. at 1253.
47. Id. at 1254. In this respect, Chief Justice Burger argued that Brewer is
indistinguishable from Stone. See note 39, supra.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 1257. Justice White was joined in his dissent by Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist.
49. Id. at 1258. When speaking of "wafer thin distinctions," Justice White was
referring to the majority's implicit suggestion, as he calls it, that "the right involved
in Massiah v. United States . . . as distinguished from the right involved in
Miranda v. Arizona . . . is a right not to be asked any questions in counsel's
absence rather than a right not to answer any questions in counsel's absence, and
that the right not to be asked questions must be waived before the questions are
asked." Id. (emphasis by Justice White).
50. Id. at 1259-60. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist,
reasoned as follows: (1) "the police did not deliberately seek to isolate Williams
1977]
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would probably make it impossible to retry Williams. 51
Brewer is important to state courts, especially those of Louisiana in
view of recent conflicting Louisiana Supreme Court decisions concerning
the right to counsel. In State v. Cotton,52 the Louisiana court, in an
opinion by Justice Summers, held that a statement was voluntarily given
by a defendant who, after speaking with his attorney and being told not to
make any statements, repeatedly sought to speak with a police officer who
was aware of the attorney's advice and eventually consented to meet with
the defendant. The Court further held that the confession was not rendered
involuntary by the fact that the police officer mistakenly informed the
defendant that two persons had identified him as having been at the scene
of the crime during the time of its commission. Justice Tate in his dissent
cited the federal district court's ruling in Brewer with approval53 and
argued that allowing the prosecutor or law enforcement authorities to
interrogate a suspect held in jail, without notice to retained or appointed
counsel, erodes the constitutional right to effective representation by
counsel .14
from his lawyers so as to deprive him of the assistance of counsel"; (2) the police
officer's purpose was not solely to obtain incriminating evidence as the victim had
been missing for only two days and the police could not be certain that she was
dead; and (3) "not every attempt to elicit information should be regarded as
'tantamount to interrogation."' Id. at 1260. He added that the Court's holding that
the right to counsel was violated whenever police engaged in any conduct, in the
absence of counsel, with the desire to obtain information from a suspect after
arraignment, was too broad, that there was no "interrogation" by the police in the
instant case, and that the judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated and
the case remanded for consideration of the issue of "voluntariness." Id. at 1261.
51. Justice Blackmun stated: "With the exclusionary rule operating as the
Court effectuates it, the decision today probably means that, as a practical matter,
no new trial will be possible at this date eight years after the crime, and that this
respondent will necessarily go free." However, it should be noted that Williams
was subsequently retried and reconvicted in an Iowa trial court. An appeal is now
pending with one of the major issues being "the fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine regarding the admissibility of the tainted evidence.
52. 341 So. 2d 355 (1976), rehearing denied on Jan. 21, 1977. Justice Summers
wrote the opinion with Justice Tate dissenting and filing an opinion. Justices Tate
and Calogero both were of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted.
53. Id. at 361. Justice Tate noted that the federal district court held that
"[w]hen police have agreed with the defendant's attorney that the defendant will
not be questioned in the attorney's absence, when another attorney has asked to be
with the defendent at a particular time and place, and when the defendant has
repeatedly asserted his desire not to talk in the absence of counsel, the police
plainly should not be permitted to interrogate the defendant at all until further
notice is given to his counsel." Id.
54. Id. at 360.
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In State v, Weedon," Justice Tate's views became the majority
opinion as the court held that an accused who had been advised by his
attorneys that he could answer any questions asked of him at his booking
did not waive his rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
The defendant made extremely prejudicial remarks to the booking officer
in response to questioning which violated an agreement between his
attorneys and state police officers. Justice Tate again cited Brewer and
reasoned that the state cannot be permitted to prejudice the accused's
constitutional rights by disregarding an agreement not to question him
unless his attorneys are present .16
Brewer strengthens the right to counsel afforded criminal defendants,
broadly interprets the meaning of "interrogation," and indicates that the
Court will strictly construe the requirements for a valid waiver. However,
it is important to note that the Court has apparently returned to a more
particularized, case-by-case approach to the confession and right to coun-
sel issues, emphasizing the factual aspects of the case as was done in
decisions prior to Miranda. Therefore, the prosecution might well be
successful in convincing the Court to distinguish future cases from
Brewer.
Revealing a new trend in the Court's attitude toward criminal proce-
dure cases, Brewer v. Williams reverts to the traditional pre-Escobedo
and pre-Miranda method of dealing separately with fifth and sixth amend-
ment problems. Heralded by the news media and interested parties as the
decision in which Miranda's fate would be determined, Brewer presents a
great surprise to the unsuspecting reader as the Court barely mentions
Miranda. Brewer is especially noteworthy in demonstrating the reluc-
tance of five present justices to overrule Miranda and their possible future
preference to sidestep such a major issue by basing decisions on the sixth
amendment or other relatively uncontroversial grounds.
Emily M. Phillips
EXEMPTION OF SENIORITY SYSTEMS UNDER TITLE VII
Litigation was instituted against a nationwide common carrier of
motor freight and a union representing a large group of the carrier's
employees alleging that the seniority system established by the collective-
55. 342 So. 2d 642 (1977), rehearing denied on March 3, 1977.
56. Id. at 645.
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